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Today's investors are more rapidly informed than their predecessors a century ago, but they are neither better informed nor better behaved. In this article, a picture of individual investors during [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] drawn from investor questions to World's Work magazine is compared with a picture of investors of the 21st century as reflected in today's media. The investors of a century ago, like today's investors, wanted to be secure while they aspired to be rich, wanted to save while they were tempted to spend, wanted to feel the joy of pride and avoid the pain of regret. re today's individual investors better informed than investors in the slower times of a century ago? Are they better behaved? Investors of today are certainly more rapidly informed-by cell phone, television, and the Internet. A century ago, telephones were in their infancy; television and the Internet were unknown. Magazines, however, did exist then as today. In this article, I draw a picture of investors in the first two decades of the 20th century as reflected in their questions to World's Work magazine and compare it with a picture of investors at the opening of the 21st century as reflected in today's media.
Stocks
The giant market wave of the 1990s and its subsequent break leave the impression that all was quiet in the decade before, as if the Crash of 1987 was no more than a ripple. Similarly, the prominence of the bull market of the 1920s and the Crash of 1929 leave the impression that all was quiet during the first two decades of the 20th century. But it was not. Indeed, as presented in Figure 1 , the volatility of the DJIA during the first two decades of the 20th century exceeded its volatility during the last two decades; for 1901-1920, the standard deviation of monthly changes in the DJIA was 5.34 percent; for 1981-2000, it was 4.38 percent.
Of the early period, Sobel (1969) wrote, "In March 1907, the stock market began to show signs of weakness " (p. 190) . Indeed, hundreds of speculators were wiped out as mining stocks fell. The March drop was only a prelude to the October culmination of the panic of 1907. Runs on banks, including the Knickerbocker Trust, the Trust Company of America, and the Lincoln Trust, were accompanied by selling waves at the NYSE. When the news reached New York, the Governing Committee of the Exchange called a hurried meeting. But by the time it had begun, a line of customers had formed outside the trading area and people were queuing around the brokerages as well. The way was clear; within a few minutes, the governors decided to close trading indefinitely. (p. 208) When the NYSE opened for trading in December 1914, however, investors learned that wars can bring profits as well as losses. Investors were especially excited by "war brides" or "war stocks," which were stocks of companies that produced steel, munitions, and other materials needed for the war effort. The World's Work noted in 1915:
When two busy Americans meet nowadays, after discussing the progress of the war and perhaps personalities, one is pretty sure to ask the other: "What do you think of the market?"
The question has reference, of course, to the stock market-or, more specifically, to that A part of the market in which the so-called "war stocks" are being bought and sold. (p. 638) Reflecting the rise of war-stock prices, the DJIA increased 81.66 pps in 1915, more than in any year before or since. Because common stocks are regarded as speculative, they are frequently omitted entirely from the lists of a great many investors. Is this omission based on a thorough study of the relative merits of bonds and stocks, or is it based in part on prejudice? (p. 4)
Smith went on to accuse the investment commentators of his day of prejudice against stocks. In their turn, Graham and Dodd in 1934 accused Smith of feeding the "new-era speculation" that ended in the Crash of 1929. Quoting Graham and Dodd, Siegel (1994) 
[There is] a small and rather sketchy volume from which the new-era theory may be said to have sprung. The book is entitled Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments by Edgar Lawrence Smith, published in 1924. (pp. 37-38) Viewed from the distance of time, this debate about stocks in the early decades of the 20th century appears as a shouting match between people promoting nothing but stocks and people opposing stocks entirely. In fact, attitudes toward stocks a century ago were nuanced, much as they are today. For example, the World's Work in 1907 drew a distinction between the stocks of established companies and the stocks of new companies, and it distinguished between "businessmen," who understood the risks of business, and "inexperienced people," who did not: Mining enterprises constituted a large portion of the "poorly backed" and "wildly financed" enterprises of a century ago, and one such enterprise, United Copper, was the seed of the panic of 1907. The World's Work was beset by investors asking for advice on mining stocks, and the magazine's advice was unequivocal:
To one and all, the reply has been that the small investor should by no means purchase mining stocks. We shall make no exception to this statement. . . . The old adage that a Western mine is "a hole in the ground with a liar at the top" holds good in a remarkably large proportion of cases. Emotion plays too large a part in the business of mining stocks. Enthusiasm, lust for gain, gullibility are the real bases of this trading. The sober common sense of the intelligent businessman has no part in such investment. (1907a, pp. 8383-84) Investors lost money in mining stocks in the early decades of the 20th century, and investors lost money in Internet stocks more recently. The behavior of investors hardly changed. Christopher Kender, manager of the orders desk for equities and options at Vanguard Brokerage Services, noted about today's individual investor:
Too many investors buy stock in companies they know little, if anything, about. A great example is the Internet company craze when people were buying stocks in companies just because they had "dot.com" in their names. These companies had no earnings and dubious future. People bought them without taking the time to find out anything about the companies or about how risky their investment would be. (Vanguard 2001) Vanguard's advice about stocks today is as nuanced as the advice of the World's Work a century ago:
Individual stocks-if carefully selected-can . . . play a role in a well-diversified investment program. . . . And it's important to understand that buying any individual stock should involve extensive homework.
Infatuation with Technology Stocks.
Investors were attracted to investments in technological innovation a century ago just as they were attracted more recently. An investor wrote to the World's Work in 1916:
Certainly, the opportunities for rivaling such successes as that of the Ford Company, for example, cannot all have gone by. And if it were not for participating in such enterprises in their early days, how would all the millionaires get their money? (p. 612)
The World's Work was clear in warning investors, however, against the idea that inventions are sure to bring riches. Quoting from the World's Work, the editor of the American Review of Reviews wrote:
Perhaps the worst mistake that an investor can make is to become possessed of the idea that he should back a new invention. Just at the moment, it is airships. A little while ago, it was talking machines. Thousands of people in all the civilized countries of the world lost much money trying to reap fortunes from the muchheralded field of wireless telegraphy. It would be quite impossible to estimate the amount of money that has been thrown away by usually sane and sensible people during the past 10 years in an effort to make a substitute for the cable and the telegraph and the telephone. (Shaw 1908b) In a distant echo of the warning, Zweig wrote in a 1999 column about Internet stocks: I've been asked to answer the question "Can you get rich by buying an Internet stock fund?" and the answer is no. . . . Many people investing in the Internet are basing their decision on a complete misunderstanding of how industries grow and investors prosper. The notion that a long-term investor can become rich simply by "buying early" into a revolutionary new industry-like the Internet-is flat-out wrong.
Zweig's discussion of the automobile industry in the following quotation could have been a response to the investors who wrote to the World's Work almost a century before:
Imagine that 90 years ago you had foreseen that the automobile industry, then in its infancy, would change the world. You would have been absolutely right-but your investment would have been absolutely wrong. You could not have bought Ford, even though the company was already 10 years old: Ford did not go public until 1956. Chrysler did not yet exist. General Motors was only a year old. Instead, you would have bought the industry's dominant companies-hot stocks like Hupp, Packard, PierceArrow, Road-Runner Auto, and Stanley Motor. But other companies-like Hudson, Nash, REO, and Studebaker, not to mention GM and Ford-quickly zoomed past the early leaders. Over the next 20 years, you would have lost nearly all your money-even as the auto business was going through one of the great booms of all time.
Diversification. Tobias (1998) wrote, "If all your money is riding on two or three stocks, you are exposed to far more risk than if you've diversified over 12 or 15 (which should be enough!)" (p. 140). Are two or three stocks too little? Are 12 or 15 stocks enough?
The old adage "Do not put all your eggs in one basket" has been battling for a century with Andrew Carnegie's version: "Put all your eggs in one basket and then watch that basket. 
Bonds
In 1911, the World's Work warned investors away from thinking about high yields as free lunches. "Why should I invest money at four and a half percent, when I can get six percent with the same security?" asked a reader (p. 14924). Because the 6 percent bond is likely to be less secure than the 4.5 percent bond, explained the World's Work. Orman (2001) stressed the same issue, that high yields signal low safety, when she wrote "[I]f you could get 7 percent on a safe bond with one issuer, why on earth would you buy a bond from an identically safe issuer at 6 percent?" (p. 462).
Still, investors reach for high yields today as they did a century ago, often with disastrous consequences. A New York bond salesman wrote to the World's Work in 1910 that he was unable to sell certain bonds because Philadelphia bond salesmen were selling similar bonds that offered higher yields. The World's Work answered:
The New York house was selling bonds on a line that connected two relatively small Western cities. The Philadelphia house, on the contrary, was selling a first-mortgage bond on a line that was to connect New York and Philadelphia by an airline. Three years later, the bonds offered by the New York house were selling above par. The bonds from Philadelphia were worthless. The property had been sold at receiver's sale for a price which left nothing at all for the bondholders. 
Savings
People found it hard to muster the self-control needed to forgo consumption in favor of savings at the beginning of the 20th century, and people find it hard today. The assortment of goods and services changed during the century, but the temptation they pose has remained. Early in the century, consumers were tempted by furniture displayed in the catalogs of Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward. Speigel's catalog added the temptation of easy credit (Calder 1999) .
Today, payroll deductions to 401(k) and similar programs bolster the self-control of investors. Investors need not fight the temptation to spend 401(k) money because it never passes through their hands. Penalties for early withdrawal bolster the self-control of investors who are tempted to take money out of their 401(k) accounts before retirement. Obstacles to raiding other savings are often insurmountable; no 30-year-old can touch his or her Social Security money-not even for the shiniest of new cars.
Investors did not have such aids to self-control a century ago, but they were not without help. The World's Work advocated this method of bolstering self-control by limiting the temptation of cash:
What a young man should do with the first $1,000 he saves out of his earnings must depend on his individual circumstances. . . . If he holds a salaried position . . . the following is a good method to adopt:
1. Invest his $1,000 in a first-class bond or similar security. 2. At the beginning of the year, make a careful estimate of what he will require for his personal expenses and thus ascertain how much of his salary he will be able to save during the year. 3. Borrow the amount he thus estimates he can save during the year, using the $1,000 security he already owns as collateral, and invest the amount thus borrowed in another good bond or security. 4. Arrange to repay the amount borrowed in equal monthly installments during the year, having these installments come due on paydays, and make the payments of them the first disbursement of his monthly salary. (1913b)
Conflicting Investor Desires
Individual investors have conflicting, perhaps contradictory, desires. They want income but they also want growth; they want safety but they also want riches. This inner conflict was as true a century ago as it is today. The World's Work initiated its advice column to individual investors in 1906, and in 1911, the editor wrote:
It is just five years since this magazine announced its willingness to answer letters of inquiry about finance and investment. In this five years of close and often intimate intercourse with investors of all sorts and descriptions, the editor of this department has learned a great many things about the habits and state of mind of the individual investor. . . . One minor conclusion from all these data and experience is that the very small investor is the most inveterate bargain hunter in the world. . . . It is the small investor who always wants 100 percent on his money and who is willing to take the most astounding chances to get it. (p. 14922)
A 1907 World's Work investor implored, "Can't you find me an investment that is perfectly safe and that will give me $5,000 a year? I find I can't get along with less, and I don't want to touch my principal? " (1907b, p. 8496) .
Today, $5,000 a year seems a small amount, but it was substantial then. The effect of inflation is such that almost $58,000 would have been needed in 1996 to buy what $5,000 would have bought in 1907. 1 Recently, an investor with $725,000 wrote to Harris (1996) of Money magazine for advice about getting a bit more return: "How can we invest this money with as little risk as possible to generate income of $75,000? We are both in our early sixties and can't afford to make any big mistakes" (pp. 183-184).
The World's Work was emphatic in warning investors against unrealistic aspirations:
It is astonishing how many requests the bond dealers receive for an investment that is sure to pay its returns at all times, without regard to market or price movements. When trustees come to settling up estates and appraising the securities left by investors, they nearly always encounter bonds for which no quotation is obtainable. (1907b, p. 8497) Money magazine has been almost as emphatic as the World's Work about unrealistic investor expectations. Harris noted that the goal of the investor who wanted to generate income of $75,000 a year with low risk was too ambitious, if not impossible. She advised the investor to choose securities that were likely to provide about $63,200 a year. The amount was less than hoped, she noted, but the investor "wouldn't lie awake nights worrying that the stock market will crash" (pp. 183-184).
Some investors want more than income and safety; they want riches. One investor wrote to the World's Work in 1910 asking for securities that would turn her $1,000 into $1,000,000. She wanted, the World's Work said, "securities that will advance in value quickly. She cares little for income, stability, or marketability" (p. 13480). A million dollars is a substantial amount today, and it was even more so in 1910; more than $11 million would have been necessary in 2001 to buy what $1 million would have bought in 1910. 2 A 2001 investor inquired of Morningstar.com about stocks that might make him rich, perhaps $11 million rich: "It is my version of gambling (better odds then Vegas) so if I lose, then it won't kill me. Then again, I could end up with the next Microsoftlike stock." 3 A fellow investor advised caution: "You're preparing to jump into a game where people with advanced degrees and decades of experience still strike out on a regular basis." 4 The World's Work was even more cautionary back in its day:
The speculator who seeks "tips" from strangers, whether they be stock-market operators, financial editors, or market-sharps of any sort, is almost certain to come to grief. The ditch is fairly obvious into which the blind led by the blind must fall. (1910, p. 13482) 
Pride and Regret
Investment gains bring more than money; they also bring pride and a desire for more. The World's Work in 1912 told of an investor who had gained on his bond investment:
When he was told that his bond is now worth about $975 against the $860 he paid for it four years ago, he thought there must be some mistake, and it took another letter to convince him it was the same bond we were talking about. When he got that fact in mind, he wrote again asking for the name of another bond that would "do as well for me as this one." (p. 274)
More recently, investors in Internet mutual funds displayed similar pride and similar desire; they rushed to buy more shares. Tam (1999) He . . . points out with some regret that if he had immediately followed the advice contained in one of the letters that he received he would have bought Union Pacific only two weeks before it had its sudden jump to 219. He consoles himself with the reflection that it came down again immediately and that he worked 40 years to get his money and does not want it planted in securities that would mean a fluctuation of $6,000 or $7,000 in his available wealth in the short space of two weeks" (World's Work 1909, p. 12096).
Investor Protection
Investors are as gullible today as they were a century ago, and they are not much better protected. The Wall Street Journal described Enron as a Ponzi scheme (see " Review & Outlook" 2002) . For years, Enron booked the profits of successful partnerships while issuing new shares to cover the losses of unsuccessful ones. Eventually, the pyramid collapsed. The scale of Enron's Ponzi pyramid greatly dwarfs the scale of the original Ponzi scheme of almost a century before. Charles Ponzi operated his first scheme in 1907 and his more famous one in 1919. He promised to return $15 in 90 days to those who invested $10.
The World's Work in 1913 described an example of investor gullibility as follows:
One day, about seven years ago, a well-to-do architect of Paris found in his mail a prospectus which gave rise to an investment experience somewhat out of the ordinary. The investment offered a 26 percent return. As every experienced investor knows, those figures should have served to put the Frenchman on guard. (1913a, p. 276) But the figures did not put the Frenchman on guard, and he lost his money. He sued the directors of the company, however, and won. Directors cannot discharge their duties by willfully shutting ©2003, AIMR ® their eyes, noted the World's Work. The magazine added with satisfaction that the unscrupulous promoter is finding it increasingly difficult, year after year, to ply its trade successfully under the watchful eyes of Post Office inspectors, or state officials clothed with the authority of the rapidly spreading "blue sky" laws, and of efficiently organized investment bankers of good repute. 5 Enron's board did not protect investors better than the board of the Frenchman's company almost a century before, nor were Enron's bankers and accountants much help. Lublin and Emshwiller (2002) reported that Enron's board waived its corporate ethics code to allow the creation of partnerships that enmeshed Enron executives in conflicts of interest. Whether Enron investors can win any money back in the courts is another question. Gasparino, Pulliam, and Schroeder (2002) noted that the U.S. SEC might not be able to offer much help because of its close ties to big Wall Street firms and accounting firms and because Arthur Andersen, Enron's accountant, shredded documents.
Conclusion
Financial markets were as turbulent during the early 20th century as they are today. That period included substantial stock market declines in the panics of 1901, 1903, and 1907 and substantial stock price increases associated with World War I in 1915.
Investors in the early 20th century and today were tempted by the lure of big money from the latest technology stocks. Yesterday's investors could hardly imagine today's Internet, but they hoped as intently to make their fortunes from mines, automobiles, and the wireless telegraph. Yet, investment warnings then were similar to warnings today, and lessons that should have been learned then need to be repeated today. The World's Work (1917b) wrote the following about bubbles in mining stocks:
This man, the son of a country doctor, tells of how when he reached man's estate and was about to go into business, his father took him into the little back office and swung open the door of the rusty old safe and took out a formidable bundle of stock certificates. "My son," said he, "you are going into business and, I hope, will make some money and want to save it. When the time comes, you will wish to buy some mining stock. Everyone does. When that time arrives, come to see me. I will sell you some of mine. They are just as good and will keep the money in the family." (p. 596)
Bringing the old story up to date is easy.
Investors in the early decades of the 20th century were remarkably similar to today's investors. They wanted to be secure yet aspired to be rich, they wanted to save yet were tempted to spend, they wanted to feel the joy of pride and avoid the pain of regret. As Shaw (1908a, p. 118) 
Notes
